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Abstract—Secure multiparty computation (SMC) is an impor-
tant scheme in cryptography and can be applied in various
real-life problems. The first SMC problem is the millionaires’
problem which involves two-party secure computation. Because
the efficiency of public key encryption scheme appears less than
symmetric encryption scheme, most existing solutions based on
public key cryptography to this problem is inefficient. Thus, a
solution based on the symmetric encryption scheme has been pro-
posed. Although it is claimed that this approach can be efficient
and practical, we discover that there exist several severe security
flaws in this solution. In this paper, we analyze the vulnerability
of existing solutions, and propose a new scheme based on the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman hypothesis (DDH). Our solution also
uses two special encodings (0-encoding and 1-encoding) generated
by our modified encoding method to reduce the computation cost
of modular multiplications. Extensive experiments are conducted
to evaluate the efficiency of our solution, and the experimental
results show that our solution can be much more efficient and
be approximately 8000 times faster than the solution based on
symmetric encryption scheme for a 32-bit input and short-term
security. Moreover, our solution is also more efficient than the
state-of-the-art solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) was first proposed
by Yao in 1982 [1]. The goal of SMC is to enable parties
to jointly compute a function over their inputs without re-
vealing these private inputs. For example, a given number
of parities p1, p2, ..., pn, all participants have a private
input data, respectively d1, d2, ..., dn. They want to compute
the value of a public function f on n variables (d1, d2,
..., dn). An SMC protocol is secure if no participant can
learn more than what he/she can learn from his/her own
input from the public function and the result. SMC appears
as an essential problem in cryptography and its solutions
have been utilized in cooperative scientific computation, data
mining, privacy-preserving clustering [2], bidding and auction
in e-commerce [3], [4], secure computational geometry [5]–
[8], set intersection [9], [10], secure statistical analysis [11],
privacy-preserving image retrieval [12]–[14] and secure data
aggregation in smart metering systems [15].
The first SMC problem is Yao’s Millionaires’ problem. It is
a secure two-party computations problem and it has served as
an important building blocks in some solutions [12], [16]–[20].
The problem discusses two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who
want to know which of them is richer without disclosing their
actual wealth. This problem is analogous to a more general
problem where Alice and Bob have their private inputs, x and
y, and they want to determine the predicate x > y without
revealing the actual values of x and y. The first solution to
millionaires’ problem is presented by Yao himself. For the n-
bit numbers x and y, it needs 1 time public key encryption,
2n times public key decryptions, 2n times modular operation,
and at least 22n/2 times verifications. So it is exponential in
time and space and too expensive to be practical.
Many other solutions have been proposed to solve Million-
aires’ problem. Ioannidis et al. [21] use 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer scheme to construct a protocol that runs n times
of the OT scheme, where n is the length of the private
inputs. The implementation of the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
based on public key cryptography needs 4 times public key
encryptions and 2 decryptions. Let N = 2n be the maximal
value of the input, it needs 4 logN public key encryptions
and 2 logN public key decryptions. Lin et al. [22] propose
a two-round protocol to solve the Millionaires’ Problem.
Their protocol uses multiplicative homomorphic encryption
scheme and is more efficient than an additive one practically.
It can save computation time and communication bandwidth
in practicality. Let p be the modulo prime, the solution in
[22] takes 5n log p modular multiplications. And the size of
exchanged messages is 6n log p bits in [22].
Shundong et al. [23] propose a symmetric cryptographic
solution to the millionaires’ problem based on set-inclusion
problems using a commutative encryption scheme and claims
that it is more efficient for practical applications than known
solutions and is capable of greatly reducing the computational
cost. Unfortunately, we have discovered that the solution has
some security flaws and is not more efficient than our protocol
based on public key cryptography when the size of the input
is large.
Veugen et al. [24] have analyzed the state-of-the-art com-
parison protocols. In terms of execution time, they point that
Damgard’s solution [25] developed on the basis of the dedi-
cated DGK homomorphic encryption scheme outperforms the
other protocols. Nevertheless, this solution has an initialization
time of approximately 150 seconds for medium term security.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We analyze some security flaws of Shundong’s symmet-
ric cryptographic solution to millionaires’ problem and this
solution is not more efficient and practical than some previous
solutions.
2) We introduce a new solution based on the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman hypothesis as well as the set intersection
problem to the millionaires’ problem. Experimental results
show that our solution is more efficient and practical.
3) We further improve our solution by reducing the size of
the random secret keys without compromise security. Conse-
quently, our solution is also more efficient than the state-of-
the-art solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some discussions on Shundong’s symmetric cryp-
tographic solution to millionaires’ problem. In Section III
we propose our solution to Yao’s millionaires’ problem. In
Section IV, we demonstrate security analysis and proof to
our solution. Section V possesses experiment results as well
as analyses. Ultimately, the paper will be concluded in Sec-
tion VI.
II. SOME DISCUSSIONS ON SHUNDONG’S SYMMETRIC
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTION TO MILLIONAIRES’ PROBLEM
Shundong’s symmetric cryptographic solution to million-
aires’ problem is proposed based on a private set-inclusion
problem. This problem can be formally defined as follows:
Alice has a private number x, and Bob has a private set
X = {x1, x2, x3, ..., xn}. Alice and Bob need to know
whether x ∈ X without disclosing their private data either x
or X to the counterpart. It can be solved with a commutative
encryption scheme that has been made for the purpose of
determining whether the two numbers are equal [26]. The
commutative encryption scheme can be either an asymmetric
encryption scheme or a symmetric encryption scheme. In fact,
the set-inclusion problem is a special case of the private
intersection problem. Agrawal et al. [27] propose a solution
with a commutative encryption based on the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman hypothesis to solve the private intersection problem.
Neither of the two parties could learn the other party’s infor-
mation outside of the intersection because of lacking necessary
key information. A similar protocol is also proposed by Li
et al. based on public key cryptography [28]. However, the
two solutions suffer the same questions of more computational
complexity and can also reveal |X|. Consequently, Shundong
et al. introduce a new solution based on symmetric encryption
scheme, which is a commutative encryption scheme. And the
new solution can be efficient and maintains the privacy of
|X| [23].
In simple terms, a commutative encryption scheme must
satisfy that Ea(Eb(x)) = Eb(Ea(x)), where E is a encryption
function and a and b are two specified keys. First, the formal
protocol with a commutative encryption to the set-inclusion
problem has been defined and found in [23]. Through the
applications of a commutative scheme, a symmetric encryption
solution based on set-inclusion Protocol to the set-inclusion
problem has also been proposed in reference [23]. Shundong
et al. have analyzed the security of their protocol and proved
that it is secure in reference [23]. But in fact, their protocol
exhibits some important security drawbacks.
We discover a definition flaw in Shundong’s Protocol. If the
cardinality |U | of the set U is even, Bob could not determine
the subset A from {X, X̄} because the cardinality of the set
X could equal to the cardinality of the set X̄ according to
Protocol 1. A simply solution is that an element y /∈ U can
be added into the set X . So the cardinality of the new set X ′
is odd and it will not influence the result. For simplicity, this
flaw will not be considered for later discussion.
There exists another important security drawback in Shun-
dong’s Protocol. It is found by Xie et al. [9]. They find that
Alice could easily explore Bob’s whole set X if Alice has
known the set U . For each element e ∈ U , Alice can easily find
r′i such that e⊕ r′i = x⊕ ri. When Alice receives the two sets
of D and π(E) = {eπ(1), eπ(2), ..., eπ(t)} from Bob in step 5,
instead of computing {b1⊕s1⊕r1, b1⊕s2⊕r2, ..., bt⊕st⊕rt},
she could compute G′ = D ⊕ R′ = {b1 ⊕ s1 ⊕ r′1, b1 ⊕ s2 ⊕
r′2, ..., bt ⊕ st ⊕ r′t}. If |π(E)∩G′| = 1, then e ∈ B. So Alice
can determine the set X according to the result of Shundong’s
protocol.
Since Shundong’s symmetric encryption solution to the
set-inclusion problem has some drawbacks, their symmetric
solution to millionaires’ problem is also broken.
III. OUR SOLUTION TO YAO’S MILLIONAIRES’ PROBLEM
Some previous work based on homomorphic encryption
have studied and proposed some efficient protocols to Yao’s
millionaires’ problem. Blake et al. [29] use the additive
homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem to construct a two-round
protocol to Yao’s millionaires’ problem. The computation cost
is O(n logN) and the communication cost is O(n logN). Lin
et al. [22] also propose a two-round protocol for solving the
Millionaires’ Problem using the multiplicative homomorphic
encryptions and a special coding for the private inputs. Since
multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme is more ef-
ficient than an additive one practically, their solution saves
computation time and communication bandwidth in practi-
cality. The ElGamal encryption scheme is a multiplicative
homomorphic encryption scheme with the scalaring property.
And the Paillier encryption scheme is an additive homomor-
phic encryption scheme. For efficiency of computation, they
modify the scheme so that each decryption takes 1 modular
exponentiation without affecting the security of the scheme.
Shundong et al. propose to use the XOR operation as the
symmetric commutative function and the solution can sharply
reduce the computational overhead. Unfortunately, it does have
some security flaws. Generally, we have two policies to reduce
the computational overhead. The first one is to employ a
symmetric encryption scheme, and the second one is to employ
an asymmetric encryption scheme but we can greatly reduce
the computational number of modular multiplications.
A. 0-encoding and 1-encoding
The main idea reducing the computational number of modu-
lar multiplications is to reduce the scale of the set intersection
problem. Lin et al. [22] use two special encodings, 0-encoding
and 1-encoding.
Let x = xnxn−1...x1 ∈ {0, 1}n be a binary string of length
n. The 0-encoding of x is the set S0x of binary string x such
that
S0x = {xnxn−1...xi+11|xi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
The 1-encoding of x is the set S1x of binary string such that
S1x = {xnxn−1...xi|xi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Both S1x and S
0
x have at most n elements.
We can encode x into its 1-encoding S1x and y into its 0-
encoding S0y .
Theorem 1: x is greater than y if and only if S1x and S
0
y
have a common element.
The proof of theorem 1 and more information about 0-
encoding and 1-encoding can be found in [22].
We give an example. Let x = 10 = 10102 and y = 6 =
01102 of length 4 (we fill in the leading zeros). We have S1x =
{1, 101} and S0y = {1, 0111}. Since S1x ∩ S0y ̸= ∅, we have
x > y. And if x = 6 = 01102 and y = 10 = 10102,we have
S1x = {01, 011} and S0y = {11, 1011}.Since S1x ∩ S0y = ∅, we
have x ≤ y.
In order to construct our solution, we redefine a new 0-
encoding and 1-encoding.
Definition 1: Let x = xnxn−1...x1 ∈ {0, 1}n be a binary
string of length n. The 0-encoding of x is the set S0x of binary
numbers x such that
S0x = {xnxn−1...xi+11 0i−1, ..., 02, 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
|xi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
The 1-encoding of x is the set S1x of binary numbers such that
S1x = {xnxn−1...xi 0i−1, ..., 02, 01︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
|xi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Both S1x and S
0
x have at most n elements.
We also give an example. Let x = 10 = 10102 and y = 6 =
01102 of length 4. We have S1x = {10002, 10102} = {8, 10}
and S0y = {10002, 01112} = {8, 7}. Since S1x ∩ S0y ̸= ∅,
we have x > y. And if x = 6 = 01102 and y = 10 =
10102,we have S1x = {01002, 01102} = {4, 6} and S0y =
{11002, 10112} = {11002, 10112} = {12, 11}. Since S1x ∩
S0y = ∅, we have x ≤ y.
B. Our commutative encryption scheme
We propose a commutative encryption scheme solution
to Yao’s millionaires’ problem. The commutative encryption
scheme is constructed based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
hypothesis. Our commutative encryption scheme requires 1
modular exponentiation for each party, so it is more efficient
than multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme.
Definition 2: Let M denote a message space and K denote a
key space. A commutative encryption function is a computable
(in polynomial time) and bijection function f : M ×K → M
that satisfies that we have fb ◦ fa(m)=fa ◦ fb(m), for a given
m ∈ M , any a, b ∈ F .
Fact 1: Let M be the group of quadratic residues modulo
a prime p, where p is a large ‘safe’ prime number, i.e., both p
and q = (p−1)/2 are large primes. Let K be {1, 2, ..., q−1}.
According to Decisional Diffie-Hellman hypothesis, the power
function
fe(m) ≡ me mod p
is commutative encryption function.
(1) fb ◦ fa(m) = (ma mod p)b mod p=mab mod p =
(mb mod p)a mod p = fa ◦ fb(m)
(2) Each of the powers fe is a bijection.
The DDH is a computational hardness assumption about a
certain problem of discrete logarithms in cyclic groups. So
the security of fe depends on the computational difficulty of
discrete logarithm problem. Let h denote a public collision-
free hash function.
Protocol 1: Our solution to Yao’s millionaires’ problem
Inputs:
Alice: x and a large safe prime p, where 0 < x < 2n, n =
⌊log(p− 1)/2⌋
Bob: y and a large safe prime p, where 0 < y < 2n, n =
⌊log(p− 1)/2⌋
Output:
whether x > y.
1. Alice generates a random secret key a, where a is a large
number and a < (p− 1)/2, then Alice computes S1x and
for each s ∈ S1x computes S = S ∪ {fa(h(s)2)}.
Alice prepares l1 = n − |S1x| random numbers zj and
combines them to the set S, where zj ∈ Z∗q , 1 ≤ j ≤ l1
and each zj is unique.
Alice generates a random permutation of S, expressed by
π1(S) and sends π1(S) to Bob.
2. Bob generates a random secret key b, where b is a large
number and b < (p−1)/2, then Bob gets π1(S) and computes
G = fb(π1(S)).
Bob computes S0y and
for each r ∈ S0y computes R = R ∪ fb(h(r)2).
Bob prepares l2 = n − |S0y | random numbers zj and
combines them to the set R, where zj ∈ Z∗q , 1 ≤ j ≤ l1
and each zj is unique.
Bob generates a random permutation of R, expressed by
π2(R) and sends π2(R) to Alice.
Bob generates a random permutation of G, expressed by
π3(G) and sends π3(G) to Alice.
3. Alice gets π2(R) and computes H = fa(π2(R)).
If |H ∩ π3(G)| = 1, Bob concludes that x > y and x ≤ y
otherwise. Bob tells Alice the result.
Our solution is constructed based on the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman hypothesis. Let p be the quadratic residues modulo
prime. Let n be the length of the private inputs of x and y. The
most time-consuming computation is modular multiplications,
so we will only count the cost of modular multiplications. Our
solution takes no more than 4n log p2 modular multiplications
and the solution in [22] takes 5n log p modular multiplications.
The size of exchanged messages in our solution is no more
than 3n log p bits and it is 6n log p bits in [22].
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Goldreich [30] presents a security evaluation benchmark
based on the simulation paradigm, which has been widely used
to prove the secure of a multiparty computation solution.
A. The Semi-Honest Model
We suppose that both of the parties in our solution to Yao’s
millionaires’ problem are semi-honest. A protocol is private in
the semi-honest model if each party is unable to conclude the
private input data of another party from the final and his/her
collected intermediate computation results. And our solution
is privacy preserving in a semi-honest setting.
B. Formulation of Privacy
Goldreich [30] proposes the privacy definition of secure
multiparty computation to study the security of multiparty
computation schemes. Let f = (f1, f2) be a probabilistic
polynomial-time functionality and Π be a two-party protocol
for computing f . The view of the first party during an
execution of Π on the input (x, y), denoted by viewΠ1 (x, y),
is (x, r1,m11, ...,m
1
t ), where r
1 represents the outcome of the
first party’s internal coin tosses, and m1i represents the i-th
message it has received. The output of the first party during an
execution of Π on the input (x, y), denoted by outputΠ1 (x, y),
is implicit in the party’s view of the execution. The view and
output of the second party can be defined analogously.
Definition 3: For a functionality f , Π privately computes f
if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, denot-
ed by S1 and S2 such that
{(S1(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y))}x,y
c≡
{(viewΠ1 (x, y), outputΠ2 (x, y))}x,y,
(1)
and
{(S2(y, f2(x, y)), f1(x, y))}x,y
c≡
{(viewΠ2 (x, y), outputΠ1 (x, y))}x,y,
(2)
where
c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability,
viewΠ1 (x, y) and view
Π
2 (x, y), output
Π
1 (x, y) and
outputΠ2 (x, y), are related random variables, defined as
a function of the same random execution.
C. Security Analysis on Our Solution
Notice that in this protocol f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = x > y
or f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = x ≤ y, and the view of a party is
defined by (x, r,m1,m2, ...), where x is the party’s input, r is
the private coin tosses, and mi is the i-th message it received.
Suppose that f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = x > y. We can
construct simulator S1 as follows:
S1 receives (x, f1(x, y)) as its input, and simulates
viewΠ1 (x, y) is satisfied by eq. 1.
1. S1 first generates a random secret key b′, where b′ is
a large number and b′ < (p − 1)/2. And then S1 randomly
constructs a number y′ such that |S1x ∩ S0y′ | = 1.
2. S1 prepares l′2 = n− |S0y′ | random numbers zj .
3. According to protocol 1, S1 computes S1x, S
0
y′ , S and R
′.
4. S1 computes π1(S), and π2(R′).
5. S1 computes G′, H ′ and π3(G′).
Let S1(x, x > y) = {x, a, b′, S1x, S0y′ , S,R′, π1(S),
π2(R
′), G′, π3(G
′),H ′, |H ′ ∩ π3(G′)| = 1}. Since
viewΠ1 (x, y) = {x, a, S1x,S, π1(S), π2(R′),π3(G′),H ′, |H ′ ∩
π3(G
′)| = 1}. So it shows that
{(S1(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y))}x,y
c≡{(viewΠ1 (x, y), outputΠ2 (x, y))}x,y.
Simulator S2 for simulating viewΠ2 (x, y), such that
{(S2(x, f2(x, y)), f1(x, y))}x,y
c≡{(viewΠ2 (x, y), outputΠ1 (x, y))}x,y.
Similarly, if f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = x ≤ y, we can construct
two simulators S1 and S2, such that
{(S1(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y))}x,y
c≡{(viewΠ1 (x, y), outputΠ2 (x, y))}x,y,
and
{(S2(x, f2(x, y)), f1(x, y))}x,y
c≡{(viewΠ2 (x, y), outputΠ1 (x, y))}x,y.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experiment Settings
In order to demonstrate the fact efficiency of our solution,
we implemented our protocol using Python 2.7 based on
Charm-Crypto [31] which depends on a few open-source C
math libraries including OpenSSL, GMP (GNU Multiple Pre-
cision Arithmetic Library) and PBC (Pairing-based Cryptog-
raphy Library). We builded the Charm-Crypto based on GMP
6.0.0 [32] not using the side-channel silent mpz powm sec
function. And all of the experiments have been carried out
on a machine running the Ubuntu subsystem in Windows 10
System with an Intel i5-4690 Processor at 3.50GHz and 8GB
RAM. The asymmetric cryptographic key lengths have been
chosen according to the current NIST standard from 1024 to
8192 bits.
B. Comparision with the Solution based on Symmetric Com-
mutative Encryption Scheme
Because the efficiency of public key encryption schemes
appears less than 0.1% of symmetric encryption schemes, no
solution developed on the bases of the public key cryptography
to Yao’s millionaires’ problem can be efficient [23]. Let
















Fig. 1. Processing time of Shundong’s Protocol vs. input size(2bits)
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PROCESSING TIME (MS) BETWEEN OUR AND
SHUNDONG’S PROTOCOL
Input size (bits)
Protocol 1 for 7 kinds
of modulus size(bits) XOR inShundong’s Protocol1024 1536 2048 3072 4096 6144 8192
8 14 39 85 265 601 1680 3560 0.02
16 26 78 171 529 1199 3360 7106 5.419
32 52 154 341 1056 2403 6724 14,361 414,472.559
64 104 308 681 2112 4805 13,441 28,674 -
128 209 617 1363 4223 9614 26,871 571,77 -
256 432 1270 2734 8462 19,215 53,785 114,074 -
512 891 2520 5512 16,977 38,510 107,623 228,183 -
N indicate the maximal value of the input in Shundong’s
protocol and its bit size is n = ⌈logN⌉. Shundong’s Protocol
takes 4N XOR operation. When N is a small number, It is
inevitable that Shundong’s protocol is more efficient than our
protocol. For the demonstration of the fact computation cost
of the solution based on symmetric commutative encryption
scheme and asymmetric commutative encryption scheme, we
implemented our protocol 1 and XOR operation in Shundong’s
protocol in accordance with the previous experiment settings.
We test the performance of XOR in Shundong’s Protocl
and results have been presented in Fig. 1. The input size is
chosen from 8 to 32 bits. As evident from the Fig. 1, it can be
clearly observed that, with the linear increase in the size of an
input, the processing time of Shundong’s Protocol is increased
linearly.
The Diffie-Hellman “group” is used for public cryptograph-
ic schemes. These groups are approximately as strong as
a symmetric key. We choose 1024 (Group 2), 1536(Group
5), 2048(Group 14), 3072(Group 15), 4096(Group 16),
6144(Group 17) and 8192(Group 18) bits Diffie-Hellman
groups to test the performance of our Protocol 1. The results
of processing time are summarized in Table I.
As suggested by Table I and Fig. 2, we can observe that
as the size of an input increases linearly the cost is almost
increased linearly for the same modulus size.
The security level of our solution is determined by the
modulus size, and it is more secure with the longer modulus
size and the cost also is more expensive. Accordingly, we
can determine the modulus size in accordance with security
strength. From Table I, without considering the intersection
operation, we can observe the fact that the computation cost
of the XOR operation in Shundong’s protocol is very small
if the size of the private input is also small, otherwise the
cost is large, for instance when the input size bit is 32. When
the input size bit is 16, the cost for the computation of XOR























Fig. 2. Processing time of Protocol 1
vs. input size(bits)


















Fig. 3. Comparison of Processing time
of Protocol 1 while the key size is 160
bits and 1024 bits
operation is 5.419 ms. Thus, we can conclude the cost to be
no less than 355,139.584 (5.419∗216) ms and it is actually
414,472.559 ms. And we can continue to conclude the cost to
be no less than 56,448 years when the input size bit is 64. So
Shundong’s protocol is too expensive to be practical when the
input size is large. Thus, our solution to Yao’s millionaires’
problem is more efficient and practical than the solution based
on symmetric commutative encryption scheme.
C. Comparision with the Solution based on DGK Encryption
Scheme
It should be taken into notice that the parameter p is a large
safe prime chosen in Protocol 1, i.e., both p and q = (p−1)/2
are large primes. In fact, the parameter p could be such a prime
that p− 1 has a sufficiently large prime factor q. “sufficiently
large” means that the size of q is at least 160 bits, i.e.,
q > 2160. For short-term security, the 2160 setting is imposed
by the lower-bound requirement of the index computation
attack algorithm called λ-method or kangaroo method for
solving the discrete logarithm problem proposed by Pollard
[33]. Thus, the random secret keys size setting for a and b
in Protocol 1 can be 160 bits without having degenerated the
underlying intractable discrete logarithm problem [34]. The
performance of our solution to Yao’s millionaires’ problem can
be further improved. The improved results are summarized in
Fig. 3 while a ≈ 2160 and b ≈ 2160. It should be taken into
notice that the processing time of Protocol 1 for a ≈ 2160
and b ≈ 2160 may have been reduced by 4 times while the
parameter size of p is 1024 bits.
In terms of processing time, Damgard’s solution [25] based
on the dedicated DGK homomorphic encryption scheme is
the state-of-the-art comparison protocol. We also compare the
performance of the state-of-the-art comparison protocol based
on DGK homomorphic encryption scheme with our solution
based on symmetric commutative encryption scheme. For a
24-bit input and medium-term security, the results in Table II
suggest that our solution outperforms Damgard’s solution in
terms of processing time. Owed to the fact that DGK ho-
momorphic encryption scheme requires one complex modular
exponentiation, it can be computed in advance during idle
times. The processing time has also been presented in Table II
under the assumption that hr can be pre-computed during
idle times. As evident from the Table II, it can be observed
that our solution also outperforms Damgard’s solution with
precomputations in terms of processing time.
TABLE II
COMPARISON RESULTS OF PROCESSING TIME (MS) FOR A 24-BIT INPUT
AND MEDIUM-TERM SECURITY
solutions our solution Damgard’s solution Damgard’s solutionwith precomputations
processing time 24.31 132.52 39.99
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discuss some drawbacks in Shundong’s
symmetric cryptographic solution to millionaires’ problem
and introduce a new solution based on the set intersection
problem. Our solution based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
hypothesis is an asymmetric commutative encryption scheme.
We also use two special encodings to reduce the computation
cost of modular multiplications and the scale of the set
intersection problem. To compare the fact computation cost
of the solution based on symmetric commutative encryption
scheme and asymmetric commutative encryption scheme, we
implement XOR operation in Shundong’s protocol and our
protocol. It is found that Shundong’s protocol is not more
efficient than our protocol when the size of the input is large.
Moreover, experimental results show that our solution is more
efficient and practical than the state-of-the-art comparison
solution.
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